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ABSTRACT
Does the format of a financial aid program influence how it affects college decisions? This paper
examines this question by focusing on state appropriations to public postsecondary institutions.
While these funds subsidize tuition costs for in-state students, the in-kind format of the aid and
resulting price gap between public and private colleges could also affect choices between colleges.
The paper analyzes this possible effect utilizing a conditional logistic choice model, which exploits
extensive match-specific information between individuals and nearly 2,700 colleges. Using
estimates of how price, quality, and distance influence college decisions, I examine the impact of
several dissimilar state subsidy regimes and simulate how decisions would change if the aid were
awarded in other ways. The results suggest that the level and distribution pattern of state subsidies
strongly influence decisions. When in-kind subsidies are large, students appear to choose public
colleges even if the gap in resources between public and private options is substantial. If the aid
were instead distributed as a credit applicable to any in-state college, up to 29 percent more students
would prefer to attend private four-year colleges. The results also suggest that the in-kind subsidies
create incentives for students to favor public four-year colleges over two-year institutions.
Bridget Terry Long







SECTION I: INTRODUCTION 
State appropriations to public colleges form the most significant higher education aid policy in 
the United States.  During the 2002-03 school year, contributions by state governments totaled $63.6 
billion, nearly four times the amount of grant aid administered by the federal government (Palmer, 2003).  
These state subsidies constitute nearly two-fifths of the total revenue received by public colleges while, 
in contrast, private institutions rely primarily on tuition income (nearly half of their total revenues).  This 
difference in revenue source is apparent from the average tuition costs of colleges in each sector.  During 
2002-03, four-year private colleges charged a mean list price of $18,273 while public four-year colleges 
charged only $4,081 for in-state students (College Board, 2002).  After accounting for the fraction of the 
disparity attributable to differences in expenditures, the price gap remains large and could affect the 
sector and quality of colleges students choose.
1  Therefore, while state subsidies may reduce price 
barriers to postsecondary education by allowing public colleges to charge in-state students a discounted 
price, they may also affect choices between colleges.
2  This paper examines how the in-kind format of a 
financial aid program influences the effect it has on college decisions about enrollment and choice. 
Governments have implemented several types of financial aid programs to reduce college price 
barriers and lower the cost of capital for liquidity-constrained individuals.  Fungible aid, such as the 
federal Pell Grants, may be applied to any school and thereby extends the entire budget constraint of a 
student.  Quite the opposite, in-kind aid is linked to specific colleges and extends the budget constraint 
only for particular choices.  State tuition subsidies thereby disturb tradeoffs between colleges since 
tuition costs for schools in the unsubsidized private sector are expensive relative to state-supported 
public institutions.  Because colleges vary in the resources they offer, this price distortion could affect 
college investment decisions in nontrivial ways.  There may be important quality differences between the 
institutions in a student’s opportunity set, and the price gap created by the in-kind subsidies could 
                                                           
1 During the 1991-92 school year, the focus of this study, private four-year colleges spent $1,258 more per student 
on instruction, academic support, and student services than public four-year colleges.  Privates spent $4,245 more in 
terms of total educational and general expenditures.  Source: Calculated by the author using the 1991-92 IPEDS.  
2 Given budget constraints, state aid allows for reductions in other sources of revenue at public colleges, most 
notably tuition.  The correlation between the mean tuition cost of four-year, public colleges and the mean amount of 
state appropriations received by such schools was –0.7 from 1977 to 1997 (NCES data).  In practice, schools are 
generally discouraged by the state from increasing the tuition above a certain percentage each year unless state 
appropriations are reduced thereby implicitly linking the subsidy and tuition level.    2
persuade individuals to choose schools that devote fewer resources, such as expenditures, faculty, or 
peers, to the production of education.
3   As a result, this particular form of aid could cause individuals to 
invest in less quality-adjusted human capital than they would if the grants were fungible and perhaps less 
than they would in the absence of aid.  Peltzman (1973) concludes that in-kind tuition subsidies therefore 
could reduce the aggregate consumption of higher education, contrary to the aims of an aid policy. 
The price distortion may also affect the incentives of public institutions. If the subsidies enable 
public colleges to avoid competing directly with private institutions, then they will have less incentive to 
maximize educational quality while minimizing costs.  In fact, if private colleges are more efficient, 
inducing students to attend the subsidized, public colleges would result in a welfare cost (Sonstelie, 
1982).  Recently, several states, most notably Colorado, have begun to consider reforms that would 
reduce state operational subsidies in favor of college vouchers for students with the hope that such 
changes would force public colleges to be more responsive to students’ needs. 
Many also question whether aid irrespective of income is the best method to provide support 
since the subsidies may primarily help inframarginal students who are without need even when facing 
unsubsidized costs.  Moreover, the method of financing the aid may cause unintended redistribution.  
State appropriations per student vary greatly across colleges, and therefore, attendance patterns have a 
substantial impact on the amount of aid students of each income level receive.  Using California data, 
Hansen and Weisbrod (1969a and 1969b) found that college attendance at highly-subsidized schools is 
primarily a middle- to upper-income activity.  Because all income groups pay taxes, they argue that state 
subsidies could therefore be regressive depending on the progressivity of state sales, income, and 
property taxes.  These findings have sparked an ongoing debate about the incidence of state tuition 
subsidies.   
This paper focuses on the effect of in-kind state tuition subsidies on several aspects of the 
enrollment decision.  First, how does the aid affect whether individuals choose to attend college and 
which school they choose?  Second, do in-kind subsidies induce students to choose lower-quality 
colleges than they would otherwise as asserted by Peltzman?  That is, does the practice of subsidizing 
                                                           
3 Since students are considered inputs as wells as outputs in educational production, students with lower test scores   3
public colleges negatively distort human capital investment decisions?  Finally, the paper examines the 
counterfactual proposition of how student decisions would change if the state aid were no longer in-kind 
and instead were given as direct grants to students that could be applied towards the tuition costs of any 
in-state college.   This simulation provides a sense of the proportion of students’ decisions that are 
affected by the in-kind nature of the aid.    
To assess the impact of tuition subsidies on college investments, this paper estimates a model of 
college choice developed in Long (forthcoming).  It is designed to take advantage of important match-
specific information between students and potential colleges. Unlike previous work that has had to rely 
upon state means or greatly simplified the college decision, I estimate a conditional logistic model in 
which each individual’s match with 2,669 potential colleges is examined.  Tuition costs are individual-
specific based on state of residence net an expected Pell Grant.  Variables also measure the similarity of 
the student to prospective college peers and the distance of the college from the student.  Finally, the 
model includes several variables to measure the educational resources available to students, including 
peer and faculty quality and expenditures.  While this model estimates the probability of attending each 
college in the choice set, conditional on college enrollment, a second model estimates whether the 
student would enroll in college at all.
4  Students who do not attend college in one state might decide to do 
so in another given a different set of alternatives and prices.  To account for this, I estimate the likelihood 
of attendance using a basic logistic model with controls for background, local labor market conditions, 
and the characteristics of the college most-likely to be attended. 
The parameters of this two-step college choice model are identified off of the considerable 
variation in states’ in-kind subsidy programs.  For example, during the 1991-92 school year (the focus of 
this study), state appropriations per public college student ranged from $10,296 in Alaska to $3,021 per 
student in Vermont.  Likewise, the subsidized tuition prices of public four-year colleges differed by state: 
that year California charged only $1,448 on average while Vermont charged $4,625.
5  However, 
distinctions between state programs involve not just the average amount of the subsidy but how the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
could provide less-favorable peer effects than higher-achieving students.   
4 While ordinarily a nested logit model would be used to estimate the two decisions simultaneously, the conditional 
logit model is too complex for a simple application of the theory, and therefore, a two-step method is applied.   4
subsidies are distributed among schools with different degrees of selectivity (student body aptitude), 
expenditure levels, and levels (two-year versus four-year).  Several possible subsidy regimes exist.  At 
one extreme, a state could offer highly-selective, subsidized public colleges.  For example, California 
supports UC Berkeley, which boasts a median student body SAT of 1250 and 1991-92 student 
expenditures over $12,000 per student (see Figure 1).  In contrast, a state may only support schools with 
average-ability students.  For example, Massachusetts does not offer public colleges with a student body 
SAT median above 950 or student expenditures above $5,900 per student (see Figure 2).
6  Rather than 
mask this variation by using the average characteristics of the colleges in a state as has been done in the 
previous literature, this study attempts to account for the substantial heterogeneity in the market of higher 
education and test how the distribution of colleges could affect enrollment decisions. 
Because populations vary by region, linking state aid to the investments made by each state’s 
students would be misleading.  However, estimates from this college choice model allow me to assess 
the impact of state in-kind support by simulating the effect of different subsidy regimes on a common 
group of students.  To test Peltzman’s hypothesis, the paper demonstrates what would happen if 
individuals were presented with the level and distribution of subsidies they would face in several, 
dissimilar states.  While there may potentially be endogeneity between state policies and their 
populations, states with similar demographics pursue vastly different policies providing the opportunity 
to do such a comparison.  Further simulations explore how decisions would change if states used their 
current appropriations to fund a college voucher.  Public college prices are adjusted upward to account 
for the loss of state appropriations, and in-state tuition amounts are reduced by the value of the state 
voucher.  The results suggest that the level and distribution of state subsidies strongly influence college 
investment decisions, and Peltzman’s hypothesis is valid.  When in-kind subsidies are medium to large, 
students appear to choose public colleges even if the gap in resources between public and private options 
is substantial.  If states instead awarded individuals with a voucher that could be applied to any in-state 
school, the number that would prefer to attend private four-year colleges increases by 20 to 29 percent.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 Digest of Education Statistics (1993).  Per student figures are in terms of fulltime equivalent (FTE) enrollments. 
6 In 1992 dollars.  The college selectivity measures are from Barron’s Educational Guides (1997).  Student 
expenditures are defined as funds for instruction, academic support, and student services.   5
 
SECTION II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In-kind Financial Aid and College Demand 
Several justifications for the state support of higher education are rooted in economic theory.  
First, capital markets for financing higher education are imperfect, and liquidity-constrained individuals 
may not be able to secure the funds necessary to make their optimal investments.  State subsidies address 
this market imperfection by providing a long-term loan: individuals benefit as students and repay the 
state in taxes over the rest of their lives.  Furthermore, state aid could induce society-at-large to invest at 
a more optimal level.  The private investment considerations of an individual ignore the positive 
externalities education produces for society and may lead students to underinvest in education.  A policy 
that increases individual investments, and the resulting education externalities, could therefore move the 
economy toward a social optimum.  Aid to educational institutions may also be justified if colleges and 
universities provide beneficial public goods such as products or information for the state.  Finally, the in-
kind format of the aid and the fact that public institutions are the providers of the product reduces the 
likelihood that the service rendered will be inadequate or below expectations.   
While economic theory suggests that state subsidies could help remedy market imperfections, in-
kind aid could also generate distortions.  Peltzman (1973) suggests that in-kind subsidies may discourage 
students from investing in education beyond what is offered at the subsidized schools.  Of particular 
concern are students who, in the absence of subsidies, would choose to invest in slightly more education 
than that offered by public colleges. Figure 3 illustrates the logic.  Individuals have a budget constraint 
that relates the level of investment in higher education to the consumption of other goods.  Private 
options sit on the curve (which has been drawn as linear for simplicity).   However, due to the state 
subsidy, the price of a public college, for any given level of educational expenditures, is lower than that 
of a private school.   Public options allow students to invest in more human capital than is dictated by 
their original budget constraint and still consume the same amount of other goods.  Therefore, an 
individual’s budget constraint becomes “kinked” at the public options.  Individuals will tend to gravitate 
towards the public options due to the accompanying increase in the consumption of other goods.  If a   6
sufficient number of students adjust their investments downward in terms of expenditures and quality, 
then aggregate educational investment could fall (Peltzman, 1973). 
The insurance properties of state aid generate further concerns about college demand.  Since state 
aid is funded by income taxes, individuals are not held fully responsible for the costs of higher education 
if they do not realize a large educational return.  Therefore, adverse selection may be a problem if the 
subsidies encourage college attendance among individuals who know they have a low probability of 
earning enough later in life to fully “repay” the state for its expenditure on their education.  Furthermore, 
a moral hazard problem may exist if individuals invest in a great deal of education but elect never to 
work and therefore do not “repay” the state at all. 
 
Estimates of the Effect of Price on Student Demand 
Economists have utilized the demand framework to study how changes in the price of higher 
education have affected individuals’ choices about college.  College demand will depend upon the cost 
of education, the prices of alternatives, and the preferences of the individual subject to a budget 
constraint.  Therefore, investment in higher education should be negatively related to tuition costs, and 
public tuition subsidies should increase the probability of enrollment.   
Most studies on the effect of cost relate college investment to tuition and/or aid levels using 
variation across time or geographic region.  Campbell and Siegel (1967) were likely the first to do this 
when examining the demand for higher education from 1919 to 1964.  Building upon this approach, 
Hopkins (1974) exploits 1963 state-level variation with controls for state education and income levels 
and finds a demand elasticity of -0.10 with respect to net public tuition (mean state charges minus mean 
state scholarship aid).  In other words, the discouragement effect of a $1,000 increase (1992 dollars) in 
public tuition in 1963 would have caused a ten percent drop in attendance.
7  Hopkins also documents a 
substitution effect: he finds that private college enrollments increase when public tuitions rise thereby 
highlighting the importance of relative costs in students’ decisions between colleges in different sectors.  
                                                           
7 Figures are reported in 1992 dollars so as to make them comparable to the results of this study.  A $1,000 change 
is equivalent to a $222 increase in 1963 dollars or doubling the mean tuition cost of public colleges at that time. 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S.     7
Hopkins concludes that policies that lower public tuition levels could cause some inframarginal students 
who would have otherwise chosen a private college to reallocate themselves to the public sector.  
Manski and Wise (1983) try to more precisely approximate the college outlook of a student using 
a multinominal logistic model of school choice.  They define the opportunity set of a student by 
exploiting information about the student’s application set and nearest community college and find tuition 
costs to have the expected negative effect.  Similar to the majority of studies reviewed by Leslie and 
Brinkman (1988), Manski and Wise predict that a $1,000 change in price would result in a three- to five-
percentage point change in college attendance.  The magnitude of the effect is found to be approximately 
equal for changes in scholarship aid. 
Kane (1995) provides more recent estimates of the importance of public tuition levels by 
examining both between-state differences and within-state changes in public tuition prices during the late 
1970s and 1980s.  Using several data sources (the High School and Beyond, National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth, and October Current Population Survey), he finds a response of -0.10 to -0.20 for a 
$1,000 increase (1992 dollars) in public two-year tuition.  This translates into an elasticity of demand of -
0.20.  Kane also find that low-income students and those attending two-year colleges appear to be most 
affected by price changes. McPherson and Schapiro (1991) provide further support for the notion that 
low-income students are more sensitive to price.  They estimate that a $150 increase (1994 dollars) in net 
price over time led to a 1.6-percent decline in enrollment among poorer students (an elasticity of -0.41).  
McPherson and Schapiro do not find evidence that increases in net cost inhibit enrollment for more 
affluent students.  
While these studies have established the importance of price in college decisions, Ganderton 
(1992) provides the first direct test of the Peltzman hypothesis.  Ganderton examines the effect of state 
subsidies on students’ college choices particularly focusing on school quality.  Defining college quality 
using the mean student body SAT scores of a school, he finds that students choose a substantially less 
selective public college than they would have chosen in the private sector thereby providing suggestive 
support of Peltzman’s hypothesis.  
   8
Concerns about Aggregation 
While college demand studies based on cross-sectional variation in state-level tuition data have 
been informative of the responses of students to college price and aid, the results are primarily identified 
by fixed differences between states.  These estimates could therefore be misleading because it is difficult 
to distinguish the impact of tuition from any other characteristic of the state that has remained constant 
over time.  As Kane (1995) and Rouse (1994) caution within their own work, interpreting state variation 
as a natural experiment for tuition changes has the problem that omitted state factors may be correlated 
with enrollment, subsidy level, and tuition.  For example, if unobserved state preferences for higher 
education cause a state to provide larger tuition subsidies, the unobserved preferences could be 
negatively correlated with the mean tuition level of the state.  The resulting parameter on tuition would 
be biased downward. This would suggest that the relationship between enrollment and tuition cost has 
been underestimated using state cross-sectional data.  However, state income per capita may be 
positively correlated with tuition levels.  This would result in the relationship between enrollment and 
price being exaggerated in estimation. 
Another weakness of cross-sectional data at the state level is that it masks much of the 
heterogeneity in the market of higher education.  While state subsidy and tuition levels vary significantly 
by state, most of the variation exists at a finer level.  Tuition levels and subsidy amounts vary greatly 
among different levels of schools within a state.  Public universities typically receive the largest 
subsidies, nearly the double the subsidy of public two-year colleges and on average ten percent more 
than that of public four-year colleges. Tuition levels differ in a similar manner by type of school with 
universities costing the most and two-year colleges the least.  These differences also exist between four-
year, public colleges and universities.  In California, for example, each University of California branch 
campus receives at least two and a half times the amount of state appropriations of a California State 
University site.  In 1991-92, UC Davis received state appropriations that amounted to $11,536 per full-
time equivalent (FTE) student while CSU Fullerton only received $2,962 per FTE student.  Likewise, 
tuition costs vary.  That year UC Davis charged $2,980 while CSU Fullerton cost only $1,480.
8  Cost is 
                                                           
8 Calculated by the author using the 1991-92 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).   9
not the only variation that state-aggregation would mask. State variation in the number and quality of 
schools available to students is also substantial.  States like California and Pennsylvania offer over thirty 
public, four-year institutions while states like Michigan and Virginia offer only fifteen.  In terms of 
student body aptitude, a proxy for peer resources at the school, only Virginia and California offer public 
institutions rated as the most selective.
9 
Using state means masks much of the variation in cost, subsidies, and quality that could more 
clearly influence enrollment.  For example, an above-average student in Massachusetts would have a 
very different opportunity set than one from California (review Figures 1 and 2).  While each student 
would face similar costs for any private college in the country (except for traveling costs), the resident of 
California would have cheap public colleges available to her that provide substantial educational 
resources and peers of high-ability. If the student chose a public college in California rather than 
Massachusetts because it more closely matched his characteristics, there would be no way to distinguish 
in the data why.   In fact, in a case like this, if the mean tuition levels in the state in which a college was 
not chosen were lower, it would appear that higher tuition costs increase the likelihood of attendance 
although unobserved school differences are really the motivating factor.   Because ignoring the 
distribution of resources to different types, levels, and qualities of schools within a state could bias 
estimation of the parameters of college decisions, college heterogeneity is a major source of 
identification problems in determining the effect of tuition price and state subsidies.  This study will 
avoid these problems using a framework designed to account for this variation. 
 
SECTION III: FRAMEWORK AND MODEL 
  This section explains how this study accounts for heterogeneity in the college market using a 
conditional logistic choice model and a basic logistic enrollment model as developed in Long 
(forthcoming).  Remaining concerns about the possible endogeneity of subsidy levels and an explanation 
of the data used are also discussed.   
 
                                                           
9 Since students are considered inputs as wells as outputs in educational production, students with lower test scores 
could provide less-favorable peer effects than higher-achieving students.     10
Theoretical Framework 
Assume an individual has J colleges from which to choose.  Each school, j, can be characterized 
by a vector Y which is composed of measures of college price and resources: 
 
(1)   Yj  =  { Pj , EXj , SBj }   
 
where Pj is the tuition price of school j.  School resources are divided into two parts: expenditures 
(including faculty resources), denoted by EXj, and peers, measured by student body aptitude, SBj.  In this 
way, each college can be viewed as a package containing resources for a given price.  From these 
characteristics, an individual can infer how much value-added each school will produce for his human 
capital and consider the consumption goods the college offers.
10   
A vector X contains the individual’s attributes such as high school performance, family income, 
and residence, which might affect his demand for education and his opportunity set.  For example, his 
prior performance and ability will affect his likelihood of being accepted by a highly-selective college as 
opposed to a junior college.  Let the value of the j
th college to the i
th decision maker be given by U(Yj, 
Xi).  This value may partly depend on an interaction of the individual’s characteristics with those of the 
school.  For example, the distance of college j for person i is determined by the residence of the student 
relative to the location of the school.  Additionally, a discount for college j (e.g. a state tuition subsidy) 
may depend on the residence of the individual.  Utility may have random elements so that all individuals 
with Xi are not assumed have the same tastes: 
 
(2)   U  (Yj, Xi) = Ū (Yj, Xi) + εij 
 
That is, there are random deviations from the mean valuation Ū.  If we assume that the non-random part 
of utility is a linear function of individual and college characteristics we get: 
 
(3)   U  (Yj, Xi) = Zij1β1 + Zij2β2 + Zij3β3 + . . . + Zijkβk + εij 
 
                                                           
10 These two components of human capital accumulation, production and consumption, are an implication of the 
Becker and Rosen models of human capital.  They are denoted as an institution’s quality in this study.   11
where β is a vector of parameters, Zij are the variables that affect utility, and k is the total number of 
variables.  Z may include variables that describe the elements of Y (i.e. EXj and SBj), interact Y and X to 
form match-specific measures (i.e. Dij), or dummy variables. 
Individuals compare the potential returns to attending different colleges along with the option of 
not enrolling and entering the labor market directly.  The college decision is therefore made up of two 
simultaneous choices.  The individual must determine his best college option and concurrently decide 
whether to attend college at all.  The individual chooses the option that maximizes his lifetime utility 
subject to his budget constraint as shown in (4). 
 
(4)     choose Yk   iff   U (Yk, Xi)  ≥  U (Yj, Xi)   ∀ k  ≠  j  with   Pik ≤  Ii  
 
where Ii is the budget constraint and is related to income. 
 
The College Choice Model 
The above framework emphasizes several points that must be addressed in estimating how 
individuals choose between colleges conditional on enrollment.
11  First, there is substantial heterogeneity 
among colleges that must be adequately characterized using institutional information on each school’s 
tuition price, expenditures, and student body characteristics.  Second, match-specific information is an 
important part of the model since colleges treat students differently depending upon residence.  
Furthermore, a particular college may not suit all students well, and this will depend on how the 
student’s characteristics compare with those of the college’s student body.  Finally, to understand how 
students make decisions the framework needs to adequately capture the full opportunity set of 
individuals so that tradeoffs between the opportunity chosen and the alternatives not taken can be 
explored.  This requires characterization of the nearly 2,700 colleges a student could attend.  Therefore, 
unlike ordinary regression analysis, the model must be equipped to handle multiple alternatives.   
                                                           
11 The group that did not attend college enters the analysis in a separate model.  This is due to several reasons.  First, 
describing the “not attend” option as an alternative with zero tuition cost, zero median test scores, and a distance of 
zero would bias parameter estimates.  Since some individuals would choose not to attend (the option with no cost), 
the negative effect of tuition price on college choice would be exaggerated.  In addition, the decision of whether to 
attend college is most likely nonlinear relative to choosing between different schools.  Therefore, estimates of the   12
The conditional logistic regression model is well-suited for this framework since it both allows 
for multiple alternatives and can be used to exploit match-specific information.  Also known as 
McFadden’s choice model (1973), the conditional logit has been used to study choice behavior with such 
applications as choice of travel mode and occupation, but computational limitations has not until now 
allowed its application to college choice.
12  While the form of the likelihood function is similar to that of 
the multinomial logistic regression, the variables are choice-specific attributes rather than individual-
specific characteristics.
13   
For the conditional logistic model, the data are organized as pair-wise combinations of each 
student i with each school j so that there are a total of i × j observations.  This allows for match-specific 
variables that interact information about the student with that of the college.  Using these combinations, 
the conditional logit model is made up of j equations for each individual i, with each equation describing 
one of the alternatives.  The dependent variable, signifying the choice of the individual, equals one for 
the alternative that was chosen.  The conditional logit model then calculates the probability of enrollment 
at each of the colleges in the stratum (i.e. it considers the probability of a person attending any one of the 
available schools).  It does this by computing the likelihood of enrollment at each school relative to all 
alternatives so that the probabilities sum to one for each individual (or within one stratum).  Under the 
assumption that the εij’s are independent and identically distributed with the extreme value distribution, 
we get the conditional logit functional form: 
 
(5)   Pr  (Eij)  = e 
Zijβ / ( e
Zi1β + e
Zi2β + . . . + e
ZiJβ )     
where    Zijβ = β1 Pij + β2 EXj  + β3 SBj  + β4Dij + … + εi 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
model including the “no college” option are unlikely to accurately describe both the college choice and the decision 
of whether to attend. 
12 Manski and Wise (1983) acknowledge the need to account for the many alternatives available to a prospective 
individual and outline the use of the conditional logit.  However, limitations in computing power forced them to use a 
multinomial logit to analyze the decisions of individuals in the NLS72.   
13 If the independent variables were instead attributes of the individuals rather than alternatives, then the models 
would be the same.  However, the multinomial logit model forces one to aggregate information about choices and 
enter them in a restrictive manner.  The use of the conditional logit is therefore preferable for analyzing differences 
in states in-kind subsidy regimes.   13
The probability of individual i attending college j, Pr (Eij), will be a function of the variables that define 
Zij including elements that describe the school and individual characteristics.  The format allows for 
maximum likelihood estimates of β, and the probability of any particular choice can be calculated using 
the conditional logit specification displayed in (5).  
Since the likelihood of attendance at each college is calculated relative to the alternatives within 
each stratum, there must be variation within the strata for estimation purposes.  For this reason, student 
characteristics cannot be included independently in the estimation.
14  The estimation, therefore, does not 
identify the causal effect of a student’s attributes on enrollment.  Instead, the estimates indicate how 
school characteristics affect the likelihood of an individual enrolling at a school.  Dummy variables are 
used to understand how reactions vary for different types of students.  For instance, a low-income person 
may have a high cost of capital so that small price increases could greatly affect the probability of 
enrollment.  To examine the effect of price and distance on low-income students, I interact these 
variables with a low-income dummy variable.  Likewise, a high-ability individual may be influenced 
differently by school characteristics.  If ability and school quality are assumed to be complements in the 
production of education, higher-ability students could expect to realize greater gains from schools with 
more resources.  School expenditures could therefore be more important in their decisions of whether to 
choose a college, and the variable is interacted with a dummy variable for high ability. 
  If the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) condition is met, the estimates will be 
consistent even if the decision to attend college at all is endogenous.  Possible endogeneity in the choice 
set develops from the fact that colleges available to a student will depend upon the previous decision of 
where to apply.  This application decision is based upon a student’s ranking of the colleges, and 
therefore, the opportunity set that a student will ultimately face is partly endogenous.  However, as long 
as students apply to schools that they determine to be most preferred, estimation will retain good 
statistical properties due to the IIA property.
15   
                                                           
14 The j equations within a stratum are not independent, and a person’s gender, for example, would difference out of 
all the equations within one stratum since each contains data on only one individual.  Therefore, unlike the 
multinomial regression model, non-college alternatives such as local labor market conditions can not be included 
within the model since they are individual-specific. 
15 See Manski and Wise (1983) for further discussion.  Also see Luce (1959) and McFadden (1979).   14
 
The Decision of Whether to Attend 
  The conditional logit model above will estimate the choice between colleges, but an individual 
must also decide whether to attend college at all.  As stated in equation (4), the individual will compare 
his options and choose the alternative that maximizes his lifetime utility subject to his budget constraint.  
His options will include attending college, entering the labor force, or not working at all.  Traditionally, 
researchers have used state-level measures of college characteristics to approximate the college option, 
but as discussed above, this masks a great deal of heterogeneity and may not be a good proxy for the 
actual school the individual might be considering.
16  Therefore, using the parameters of the conditional 
logit model, I predict the college that is the most likely college alternative if the individual does decide to 
attend.  A basic logistic model is then used to estimate the likelihood of enrollment with the 
characteristics of this most likely school being used to understand how individuals weight the prospects 
of college attendance against outside options. 
  This estimation strategy assumes that individuals make decisions between colleges in the same 
way regardless of whether they decide to attend or not.  This may be a concern if students who do not 
attend do not properly weight their options or lack the information needed to make decisions that would 
maximize their utility.  However, for most students likely to be on the margin of attendance, the 
predicted option is the nearest two-year or four-year, public college.  Most students are aware of these 
local options from peers, high school resources, and the local press.  Furthermore, the data suggests the 
individuals with similar observable characteristics make different college decisions due to the local 
higher education options available to them.   Several studies suggest that individuals from more 
disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to attend if they have a nearby college option with a 
reasonably low tuition price (Rouse, 1994; Kane, 1995).  Therefore, differences in enrollment may be 
due to the options available and not that the decision-making process differs by background.  In any case, 
using the “most-likely” college is a better approximation of the outlook of a prospective student than the 
state-level measures of public tuition levels previously used.   15
In analyzing the determinants of the enrollment decisions, I focus on the group with the highest 
propensity to be on the margin and compare the opportunities of those who attended to those who did 
not.  This group includes low-income, low-ability individuals who are likely to face high costs for 
securing capital and fewer benefits from college attendance assuming that ability and education are 
complements.  As such, this group will be highly sensitive to the opportunities they face.  While they 
may decide to invest in higher education given one set of opportunities, when presented with another set 
of alternatives, they may not enroll at all.  By exploiting the variety of opportunities available to students 
based on their residence, I estimate the effect of college characteristics on the attendance decision. 
 
Concerns about Endogeneity and the Supply Side of College Demand 
The conditional logit choice model avoids some of the fears of misinterpretation associated with 
aggregated, cross-sectional analysis since I am able to view the specific options available to a student 
rather than just the means of groups of alternatives.  However, endogeneity problems could arise if 
individual or group preferences within a state influence aid policy.  Unobserved tastes for education 
could affect how and why subsidies are distributed within a state in a certain way, and these preferences 
would in turn influence college decisions, thereby biasing estimates.  For example, states with stronger 
preferences for education might choose to support a wide range of options in order to attract and educate 
all types of students.  Meanwhile, a state without these preferences might choose to offer colleges that 
only provide basic education and are not selective.  Therefore, whether a high-ability student is able to 
attend a competitive, in-state public college would be influenced by the underlying preferences of his or 
her state of residence.  Moreover, how a state prioritizes the education of certain groups could also have 
an affect on the distribution of subsidies.  For instance, a state’s commitment to the education of low-
income, low-ability, or older individuals might affect its generosity to two-year colleges.  Concerns 
about endogeneity are mitigated by the fact that states with similar observable characteristics have vastly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 Manski and Wise (1983) highlight the importance of an appropriate choice set by utilizing information on the 
colleges accepted to and the nearest community college as possible college options.  Then, they estimate a 
multinomial logit to explain the choices individuals made between college and outside opportunities.   16
different subsidy schemes.  One reason for this is that the patterns of public colleges in a state and the 
distribution of tuition subsidies are strongly influenced by historical factors.
17   
The problem of unobserved preferences is likely to be most serious for marginal students because 
these individuals are most sensitive to the specific characteristics of potential colleges.  To illustrate, 
suppose state preferences affect the placement of colleges in particular areas of the state.  Since the 
proximity of schools appears to be a determining factor in the attendance decisions of marginal students, 
this group would therefore be influenced by the state’s unobserved preferences interacted with each 
individual’s specific residence.  However, because colleges appear to be distributed among 
heterogeneous communities in more populous states, this is a potential problem for estimation mainly in 
more-rural states.  To address the concern that the assignment of location could unduly drive the choices 
of some individuals, specification tests are used to verify the results.
18   
Another concern of this methodology is its focus on the demand side of college decisions without 
explicit treatment of supply-side constraints.  It is first important to note that the vast majority of 
institutions are not selective and a large majority of students are accepted into their first-choice college.
19  
Moreover, the conditional logistic choice model accounts for supply considerations in two ways.  First, 
because a student’s ability relative to that of a college’s student body may be an important determinant of 
enrollment at that school, the model includes variables that measure the difference between the student’s 
SAT percentile score and the median percentile score of the school.  These variables, therefore, account 
for the likelihood of admission and prevent the model from predicting that individuals with low test 
scores would be accepted into the most selective schools.  Additionally, the model includes controls for 
undergraduate enrollment to account for the fact that larger schools have a higher level of visibility and 
are able to admit greater numbers of students. 
 
                                                           
17 See Goldin and Katz (1999) and Quigley and Rubinfeld (1993) for a discussion of how historical factors 
influenced the development of public higher education. 
18 For the state simulations, I randomized each student’s location assignment several times to examine whether the 
results vary.  They changed little and never disputed the paper’s basic results.  See below for further discussion. 
19 According to Breland, Maxey, Gernand, and Trapani (2002), only 13 percent of public four-years and 20 percent 
of private four-years have competitive admissions processes.  Most other four-year schools do impose selective 
criteria such as high school course requirements and minimum test scores, but they accept nearly everyone who   17
The Data 
Several data sets provide the necessary individual, institutional, and state-level data.   First, the 
National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) provides information on the characteristics, ability, and 
family background of approximately 8,000 students from eighth grade to age twenty.
20  During this time 
frame, I am able to observe transitions from high school to postsecondary education or the workforce 
including the application to and enrollment in college.  A second study, the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS) provides extensive information on postsecondary institutions within the 
United States including financial expenditures and revenues, tuition costs, and enrollment.
21  These data 
were supplemented by information from the Digest of Educational Statistics and U.S. Department of 
Commerce for state-level characteristics.  Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges provided information 
on college competitiveness and student body test scores.
22  
  In order to have a better sense of net price, the amount of Federal Pell Grants that a person could 
expect to receive was subtracted from the list tuition price.  The lack of information about aid beyond 
Pell Grants is not a great concern given few students receive substantial grants.  In 1991-92, the median 
college spent only $193 in institutional aid per student.  Moreover, according to the 1992-93 National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS), only one-third of students at private four-year colleges and 
ten percent of students at public four-year colleges received any institutional grant aid.
23  Students who 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
meets those criterion.  Ninety-one percent of public two-year colleges and 46 percent of private two-year colleges 
have completely open admissions without requirements.  The rest have minimum standards. 
20 While the original data set in 1988 contained 14,622 observations, once accounting for attrition by 1994, only 
7,870 observations remained with the necessary information.  This sample has slightly higher mean years of 
parental education (14.07 years in the original compared to 14.44 years), slightly higher family income (as 
measured by a categorical variable), and were more likely to have attended a private high school (9.7 percent 
compared to 14.7 percent).  If the student’s SAT score was not available, then either: (i) an available ACT score was 
converted, or (ii) high school GPA was used to predict the SAT with controls for demographics. 
21 The sample was limited to nonspecialized, undergraduate institutions.  Carnegie codes and school names were 
used to drop the following schools from the sample: graduate programs and other specialty schools (art college, 
seminaries, etc.); college administrative offices; schools without tuition and enrollment information; single-sex 
colleges.  For schools that did not have student expenditure information in 1992, figures from other years were used 
and deflated.  A total of 2,669 colleges remained in the sample.  
22 If the median score was missing for a college but the school was grouped into a competitiveness category, the test 
score assigned is equal to the mean score of colleges in that category.  Since two-year colleges do not customarily 
require or request test scores, all were assigned an SAT composite of 700, a level that qualifies basically all 
students. 
23 Institutional Aid is most likely to affect the net price for high-ability students.  To address this concern, I tried an 
alternative measure of price equal to the list tuition price minus the expected Pell Grant minus the mean institutional 
grant per FTE student at a college (a proxy for net price).  When using this alternative measure, price is estimated to   18
do receive scholarships or grants often do so from only a few schools within their opportunity sets 
making the awards school-specific and nearly impossible to predict. Furthermore, information on a 
student’s specific need is unavailable.  Distance from a school was calculated using the zip code of the 
student’s high school (the finest geographical indicator in the NELS) and the potential college.   
To measure college resources, the models include expenditures.  However, because total college 
expenditures include many items that do not directly affect education production (i.e. research and 
infrastructure), I only include student-focused expenditures: funds spent on instruction, academic 
support, and student services.
24  Median student body SAT score proxy for peer resources.  Since a 
difference of 100 points does not mean the same thing at all places in the distribution of scores (e.g. a 
400 versus 500 compared to a 1500 versus 1600), the median score was transformed into a percentile to 
better standardize the measure.  Quadratic tuition, distance, test score, and student expenditure variables 
along with a cubic distance variable are included to allow for nonlinear relationships.  This is necessary 
because, for example, the difference between a distance of 20 to 30 miles may not be the same as a 
difference of 1200 to 1210 miles.  Table 1 summarizes the data and variable definitions. 
 
SECTION IV: THE DETERMINANTS OF COLLEGE CHOICE AND ENROLLMENT 
Estimates of the Decisions between Colleges 
Table 2 displays the estimates of the conditional logistic model using students in NELS that 
attended college. I estimate the probability of choosing at a particular college conditional on attending 
any postsecondary institution.  As shown in specification 1, a higher tuition price has a negative effect on 
the probability of enrollment at a particular school.  A student is 39 percent less likely to attend a college 
that charges an additional $1,000 in tuition costs, ceteris paribus (1992 dollars).  This translates into an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
have a more negative effect on the likelihood of choosing a particular college.  However, the alternative measure of 
price did not improve the predictive value of the model.  The original measure of price produced better predictions 
of the students’ actual choices even among the high-ability students.  The college with the highest choice probability 
is the same with each price measure 91 percent of the time.   
24 Schools found to have unreasonably high student expenditures in comparison with similar schools were assigned 
the mean expenditures for that type, quality, and level of school.  Data for 11 colleges had to be adjusted.   19
own-price elasticity of –2.8.
25  However, each additional $1,000 has a less negative effect on choice.  
Distance, another measure of cost, also negatively affects the likelihood of attendance at a school.  A 
student is 81 percent less likely to attend a school that is 100 miles farther away than a similar college, 
but the marginal negative effect of distance decreases. 
In contrast, school resources, as measured by expenditures, the student-faculty ratio, and the 
percent of the faculty with a Ph.D. or other terminal degree, have a positive effect on the likelihood of 
choosing a college.  The student-college match and school resources are also found to be important 
determinants of college choice. The likelihood of attendance at a college decreases 29 percent for every 
ten percentile-points that the student’s score is above that of the college’s average student.  The 
relationship is found to be positive if the school’s scores are higher perhaps signifying that students try to 
attend colleges with peers of higher quality.  However, as the marginal difference between a student’s 
test score and that of a school grows, individuals become less likely to attend that college.  School size is 
also positively related to the likelihood of attendance.   
Since the effect of school costs and resources may differ by student, interactions were utilized in 
specification 2.  The impact of cost on low-income individuals is examined using an interaction with a 
dummy variable equal to one for individuals with family incomes below $20,000 in 1991.  While tuition 
is not found to have an additional negative effect on the likelihood of choosing a college, distance, 
another measure of cost, reduces the likelihood of enrollment by an additional 35 percentage points.  
High-ability students also seem to be affected differently by school characteristics.  Tuition has a less 
negative effect perhaps suggesting that high-ability students expect a higher return to college and are 
therefore willing to pay more for their educations.  It could also reflect the fact that this group is more 
likely to receive institutional financial aid, which could help to cover higher costs, or that they may be 
more likely to come from more affluent backgrounds.  Moreover, a college that is 100 miles farther away 
is only 36 percent less likely to be chosen by a high-ability student while a $1,000 increase in student 
                                                           
25 While there is limited empirical evidence on the specifics of competition between colleges, several other papers 
have found significant cross-price effects for specific institutions (see Allen and Shen (1999) for further discussion).  
However, this is the first paper to estimate such effects for the entire higher education market.   20
expenditures multiplies the likelihood of attendance by an additional 15 percentage points for the first 
$1,000, ceteris paribus.   
 
Estimates of the Enrollment Decision 
The second specification in Table 2 gives a prediction of what school an individual would choose 
conditional on attendance.  However, some students will elect not to enroll in college at all.  This could 
be related to the opportunities available since an individual might not attend college facing one set of 
alternatives and prices but do so given a different distribution of subsidies and costs.  Individuals for 
whom the enrollment decision is uncertain are most likely of lower ability (and therefore confront 
uncertain or low returns to education) or low-income (and face extremely high capital costs).  This seems 
to be true as evidenced by the mean demographics of the group in the NELS that elected not to attend 
college.
26  Therefore, to analyze the attendance decision, the group of students who did not attend college 
are compared to individuals with similar characteristics but who decided to attend college using logistic 
regression models.
27   
This marginal group presumably considers local public college options, particularly two-year 
colleges, when deciding whether to attend since these schools are less of a commitment in terms of cost 
and distance.
28  Therefore, in order to estimate how local higher education opportunities affect the 
likelihood of enrollment, the characteristics of the closest two-year public college and the closest four-
year public college were used.  As shown in Table 3, specification 1, while distance and student ability 
appears to affect college attendance, the price of the closest public two-year net an expected Pell Grant 
does not.  When the closest public four-year college is used as the focus, neither price nor distance are 
found to affect likelihood of attendance.  However, the characteristics of the nearest public two-year or 
four-year college may not be true variables of interest for a student considering enrollment.  
Specification 3 instead uses the college predicted to be the most likely choice from the conditional logit 
                                                           
26 Individuals who did not attend college had a mean family income of $34,818 while the families with child who 
enrolled made on average $57,370.  Likewise, the mean SAT scores for the groups were 786 and 913, respectively. 
27 The criteria for this group were: (1) family income below $30,000, or (2) parents’ with less than 13 years of 
education, or (3) SAT scores below 900.  The sample included 2,177 students who did not and 3,484 who did 
attend.   21
model in Table 2, specification 2.  These predicted colleges are often either the closest two-year public 
college (14 percent of the time) or the closest four-year public college (36 percent of the time), and 
therefore, specification (3) is partly a combination of the first two specifications.   
Using the school predicted to be the student’s most likely choice, it is estimated that an additional 
$1,000 in list tuition price reduces the likelihood of attendance by 7.8 percent suggesting a price 
elasticity of –0.30.  This elasticity is a third larger than that found by Kane (1995).  This may suggest 
that previous estimates of the price elasticity have underestimated the influence of cost by using 
aggregated measures.  The state mean tuition level or nearest public college may not approximate very 
well the college characteristics important to students in the early 1990s perhaps due to the decreasing 
cost of distance.  However, given that this sample of marginal students is expected to be more responsive 
to price than others, it is likely that this estimate of the price elasticity is an upper bound. 
 
Comparing Actual to Predicted College Investments 
In order to test the ability of the model to adequately predict the college decisions of individuals, 
Table 4 compares the actual choices of individuals and their predicted choices using the parameters in 
Tables 2 and 3.  The entire sample of individuals (whether they attended college or not) was used for the 
predictions in the following way.  First, I calculated the probability that an individual would choose a 
particular school relative to their other options using equation (5) and the parameters of the model in 
Table 2, column 2.  Second, I calculated the likelihood of attendance for each person given the 
characteristics of the most-likely college.  This develops from the parameters of the model in Table 3, 
column 3.
29  Each student-college match was then weighted by each of these probabilities.  This process 
gives mean statistics taking into account both the relative odds of choosing a particular school and the 
likelihood of enrollment. 
As shown in Table 4, the model predicts college choices with very similar statistics as those 
schools that were actually attended.  For example, while 3,841 individuals in the sample actually 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
28 Rouse (1994) suggests that junior colleges provide a place in higher education for those not traditionally served 
by the four-year college system.  She also demonstrates that proximity is important to the marginal group. 
29 The parameters are used to calculate the probability of enrollment for each individual in the marginal group at 
each potential college.  Individuals not in the marginal group were given an enrollment probability of one.   22
attended a four-year college, the model predicts that 3,829 would.  In addition, the mean list tuition at the 
colleges attended was $5,863 while the model predicted it would be $5,634, a four-percent difference.  
The model does a slightly better job predicting the college costs and resources of those that attend four-
year schools than those that attend two-year colleges.  However, the model does overestimate the 
proportion of students that choose to attend public, four-year colleges.  
Differences between the actual and predicted choices could be due to several reasons.  First, 
prospective students may not have full information about all of their potential schools in order to make 
the most optimal decisions.  For example, they may elect to attend a more expensive school if they do not 
know about a cheaper option with the same student expenditures that is a similar distance away.  The 
differences could also occur since the variables do not perfectly describe each college option.  Colleges 
may have more to offer than can be measured by expenditures and student body test scores, and these 
qualities may be perceptible to students.  Furthermore, differences may be due to the fact that private and 
institutional financial aid enable students to attend more costly colleges with more resources.  I am 
unable to incorporate these types of aid into the model due to a lack of information (see the earlier 
discussion of this point). 
Another explanation for the differences is the lack of explicit supply constraints in the model.  I 
do not directly take into account admissions policies, and therefore, students could possibly be predicted 
to attend a college they have little likelihood of being accepted into.  However, the test score difference 
variables in the model seem to account for most of the selectivity issues. On average, the school 
percentile predicted does not differ much from what it was in reality.  The model avoids predicting 
options in which there are great differences between the test scores of the individual and of the school. 
Further support that the model does a good job of predicting decisions comes from the fact that 
the actual school attended was one the top three predictions in nearly one-third of the cases.  However, 
the fact that the model does not always predict the exact school an individual attended does not matter if 
the school predicted is similar to the school actually chosen (e.g. Harvard is predicted but Amherst is 
chosen).  This is because the important characteristics of the schools, tuition and student expenditures, 
will be the same in the data.  There would be concern if Harvard was the predicted choice, but the   23
student attended a community college instead.  The predictions do follow the general trend that high-
ability students opt for schools with higher test scores and student expenditures while low-income 
students attend two-year colleges more often, travel shorter distances, and pay less in tuition. 
 
SECTION V: THE EFFECT OF IN-KIND TUITION SUBSIDIES 
Because tuition costs seem to greatly affect the probability of enrollment at a particular college, 
individuals may accept lower quality (i.e. fewer resources) for the sake of price.  The state subsidization 
of public colleges and resulting price gap between public and private options provides an opportunity to 
test this notion set forth by Peltzman.  Two sets of simulations are performed.  The first involves altering 
the state of residence of the individual to see how his decision would change given a new distribution of 
subsidies and colleges.  This simulation compares how state regimes affect enrollment levels, the prices 
charged, and the resources received.  The second simulation explores the counterfactual of what would 
happen if the aid were not in-kind.  Using the same state spending amounts, I examine how decisions 
would change if students were instead given a voucher that was applicable to any in-state college.   
 
State Simulations  
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, California and Massachusetts have considerably different systems 
in terms of the distribution and level of state in-kind tuition subsidies.  However, each seems to have a 
strong commitment to education.  Massachusetts has long been a leader in education indicators, and in 
1992, the percentage of its population with a bachelor’s degree was the highest in the nation (27.2 
percent).  Likewise, California has a very educated population with almost a quarter of its people with at 
least a bachelor’s degree.  The substantial financial state support of colleges in California may also be 
taken as a signal of its commitment to higher education.  Therefore, with strong preferences for 
education and subsidy policies that differ significantly, Massachusetts and California are excellent states 
to compare and assess the effect of dissimilar state in-kind tuition programs.  To round out the state 
comparisons, predictions are also made for Illinois and Nebraska.  Each has a distribution of subsidies in 
the middle of Massachusetts and California.  Unlike Massachusetts, Illinois (Figure 4) offers a highly 
competitive, public option, but it is the only option, and it does not receive as much state aid or spend as   24
much in resources as the top-rated schools in California.  Finally, Nebraska (Figure 5) has a similar 
distribution of public schools as Massachusetts, but the state aid level is higher allowing a good test of 
whether large subsidies influence students to forego private options.  However, unlike the other states, 
Nebraska does not have any private colleges ranked in the Most or Highly Competitive groups, but 
students at Creighton University receive the same amount in expenditures as do students at many 
colleges rated Most Competitive. 
To compare the decisions that would be made under each state’s subsidy regime, the sample was 
first given the characteristics of a state resident.  For example, for the California predictions, the tuition 
values became in-state costs for California colleges and out-of-state costs for other schools.  Location in 
the state was randomized based on the distribution of the population among zip codes (i.e. Los Angeles 
zip codes were assigned to members of the sample in an equal proportion to the number of Californians 
that reside there).  For each location assignment, a new distance variable was calculated to each potential 
college.
30  Table 5 displays the summary statistics of the predicted college decisions when presented with 
the revised opportunity sets based on residence within each state. 
The greatest differences are between the states with the two extreme subsidy systems.  California, 
with the most generous state support, has the highest percentage of students in public colleges and the 
lowest mean four-year tuition cost of the four states.  Even with the lower cost, students under the 
California system are predicted to experience the highest level of college expenditures and median 
student body SAT percentile due to the quality of institutions supported and the large tuition subsidies.  
At the other end of the spectrum, Massachusetts, with much less state support, is predicted to have more 
than one-third fewer students in public colleges with students paying nearly three times more in four-
year tuition costs on average without increases in college expenditures.  More students are predicted to 
attend college under the generous California regime although many are predicted to attend two-year 
                                                           
30 As mentioned earlier, this methodology could affect the results because the placement of colleges may not be 
random, and proximity is an important determinant of enrollment.  For example, community colleges may be 
located in poorer areas, but since poorer individuals are not necessarily assigned to live in those areas, their 
likelihood of attendance may be underestimated.  However, in metropolitan areas, community colleges are found in 
both poor and rich areas minimizing this type of problem.  This is a greater concern for rural areas.  In order to get 
the most reliable results, the simulations were run several times for each state with a new random location 
assignment each time.  The predictions did not significantly differ thereby suggesting this concern is not significant.   25
colleges with an average tuition price one-eighth the average cost of the two-year colleges chosen in 
Massachusetts. 
The differences among the subset of high-ability students are also striking.  Nearly three times as 
many high-SAT students are predicted to choose public four-year colleges in California, and they are 
predicted to be charged one-third of the average tuition relative to Massachusetts.  More specifically, as 
residents of California, many high-ability students would attend UCLA or UC Berkeley due to their low 
costs and substantial resources.  However, in Massachusetts some high-ability students would elect to 
attend selective private institutions such as Harvard University and pay five and a half times more while 
only receiving 30 percent more in student expenditures.  Although this study does not take into account 
institutional scholarships, this aid is unlikely to completely close the tuition gap between Harvard and 
UC Berkeley for middleclass families.  In summary, when faced with California’s generous subsidies 
and diverse system of public colleges as opposed to Massachusetts’ less generous and limited array of 
public options, individuals paid far less but received a similar amount in resources.   
Illinois and Nebraska demonstrate how choices are affected in subsidy regimes closer to what 
most states offer.  In each case, more students are predicted to choose public colleges than under the 
Massachusetts system, but unlike in California, students do not receive as much on average in college 
expenditures and student body quality (SAT percentile).  The reason stems from the fact that neither state 
offers public institutions with nearly as much in resources or peer quality as California but the low price 
of these colleges is sufficient enough to encourage students to attend them.  For example, in the Illinois 
simulation, many high-ability students are predicted to choose the University of Illinois-Urbana over 
Northwestern University and the University of Chicago.  This suggests that the discounted tuition price 
of an in-state, public four-year university is enough to encourage some individuals to forego schools with 
more resources, the precise concern of Peltzman.  Further evidence of the Peltzman hypothesis is found 
by examining the predictions for Nebraska.  Approximately 76 percent of four-year college students 
would choose to attend a public institution if they were residents of Nebraska, and the mean student 
expenditures and student body test scores are the lowest of the four states.  The fact that none of the   26
public options in Nebraska fit the criteria of more selective schools translates into less in college 
financial and peer resources.  
The Peltzman hypothesis, therefore, appears valid in situations in which the level of state aid is 
average to high but the availability of public options with high levels of resources is limited.  Such 
circumstances are predicted to induce students to choose public colleges that offer fewer resources than 
private, more expensive options.  In essence, students are enticed by lower prices to forego college 
resources.   It is also worth noting that low-income students appear to be particularly attracted to the 
public options regardless of the state subsidy level or distribution of public college quality.  The 
percentage of low-income students predicted to choose public colleges in Massachusetts is only one-
quarter less than in California, a far smaller difference than that found for the sample overall or among 
the subset of high-ability students. 
 
Voucher Simulations 
A better way to test the importance of the Peltzman hypothesis is to simulate what choices would 
be made if the aid were not in-kind.  Tables 6 and 7 describe five alternative ways in which the aid could 
be distributed.  It is important to note that these simulations do not estimate general equilibrium 
outcomes.  While the simulations incorporate some thought to how student decisions might change under 
different circumstances, I do not adequately incorporate a student behavioral response in the 
simulations.
31  Furthermore, I do not account for how the supply of higher education might change under 
different distribution regimes.  If a college voucher encouraged more students to choose private colleges, 
it is unclear whether the private institutions would be able to accommodate the additional students or by 
how much or how fast they would try to increase their capacity.  However, the simulations do provide a 
manner with which to judge the magnitude of the influence of the in-kind format.  In effect, the 
predictions suggest how college preferences or intended choices might change if state subsidies were not 
distributed in an in-kind format. 
                                                           
31 For example, the voucher simulations assume that a greater proportion of students might choose to attend four-year 
colleges and that more students might choose to remain in state.  The simulations also assume perfect information, a 
particularly troublesome assumption for low-income students.   27
Column 1 of Tables 6 and 7 presents the mean tuition prices and predicted college decisions 
under the current in-kind subsidy system.  However, at the other extreme, states could elect not to 
appropriate any operational support to public colleges thereby eliminating in-kind tuition subsidies.
32  As 
shown in column 6 of Table 6, the prices of public colleges are assumed to increase by the amount of 
state appropriations per FTE student at each public college.
33  While tuition costs do not vary 
significantly among public four-year colleges of different competitiveness levels under the current 
system, if state subsidies were taken away, the more selective schools would be much more expensive 
than the less competitive and noncompetitive colleges.  This reflects the larger amount of state aid 
directed to more selective public institutions.  Additionally, the gap between public two-year and four-
year colleges would grow since four-year institutions receive more in state operational subsidies.  The 
price of private colleges would not change.  However, even under a situation of no state support, private 
colleges are still more expensive than public colleges of similar competitiveness.  For example, 
competitive public colleges cost 28 percent less than competitive private colleges on average, partly due 
to differences in expenditures per student.  Therefore, public colleges continue to have a relative price 
advantage even without the state support.   
Table 7, column 6 displays how college decisions are predicted to change under a system 
with no state support.  Two major trends are evident.  First, state support is found to significantly 
affect the choice of college sector.  The simulation without state support suggests far fewer students 
would choose to attend public four-year colleges.  Although 71 percent of four-year attendants are 
predicted to do so under the current system, only 56 percent would choose publics if there were no 
state support.  In terms of the number of students, 29 percent fewer individuals would choose public 
four-year colleges under a system without state aid (2,706 versus 1,925 students).  Low-income 
students would be especially impacted, as 38 percent fewer would choose public four-year colleges 
without a subsidy.  At the same time, the number electing to attend a private college is predicted to 
                                                           
32 All of the following simulations assume that state grant programs are not affected.  The focus here is on how state 
appropriations to colleges could be redistributed. 
33 The price of in-state public colleges is assumed to be the in-state price plus the increase due to the loss of state 
appropriations.  Out-of-state public colleges are assumed to charge the greater of the out-of-state price and the 
revised in-state price.   28
increase by one-third from 1,123 to 1,489 students.  This suggests that state in-kind subsidies 
strongly influence students to favor public colleges over private institutions. 
A second observation is that more students would attend two-year rather than four-year 
colleges if states did not provide operational support.  The number predicted to enroll in two-year 
colleges increases by 14 percent.  The shift in enrollment is more substantial among low-income 
students: one-third more low-income students are predicted to choose to attend two-year colleges.  
This result implies that the current pattern of in-kind subsidies encourages students to not only attend 
public colleges, but in particular, public four-year colleges.  Note also that although total enrollment 
is not predicted to significantly drop without state support, a shift in enrollment towards community 
colleges would have important implications for the general skill level of the labor force given the 
differences in resources and programs available at colleges of different levels. 
 The remaining simulations consider how prices and decisions would change if states continued 
to provide the same amount in appropriations for higher education, but the subsidies were distributed in 
the form of a direct voucher to students.  In this way, the state aid would be similar to the Pell Grant in 
that it would follow the student to the institution of his or her choice.  The value of the voucher is the 
total state appropriations for nonspecialized colleges divided by the FTE number of students attending 
these colleges (for simulations 2 and 3, only students attending public colleges were counted).
34  In the 
simulations in which the four-year voucher is twice as large as the two-year voucher (simulations 3 and 
5), 70 percent of students are assumed to attend four-year schools.
35   
For the simulations in columns 2 and 3, the state subsidy could be used at any in-state public 
college.  In column 2, the voucher is the same regardless of the level of the public college (this is similar 
to the current Colorado college voucher proposal) while the voucher is twice as large for four-year 
colleges in column 3.  These simulations not only remove the in-kind format of the aid, but they also 
equalize the amount of operational support among public colleges within a state.  As shown in Table 6, 
because two-year public colleges often receive less than half of what four-year colleges receive, under a 
                                                           
34 This assumes a usage rate of 100 percent.  Presently, around 85 percent of students remain in state for college.   
35 The value of the voucher for four-year colleges can be found by solving: appropriations/student = .7x + .3(x/2). 
This is slightly larger than the proportion that does so under the current system.     29
public voucher plan, many of these schools would experience reductions in price in comparison to the 
current in-kind system.  Moreover, because the more selective institutions receive a larger share of state 
appropriations, this redistribution scheme would cause many of the public flagship colleges to raise their 
prices.  These price shifts influence how enrollment might change under a public college voucher system.  
As shown in Table 7, columns 2 and 3, the vouchers are predicted to increase the number of students 
who would choose two-year colleges.  This change is particularly large among high-ability students of 
whom 53 percent more are predicted to choose two-year colleges if the voucher was the same regardless 
of level.  Overall, the resources available to students at their chosen institutions would slightly decrease.  
This suggests that if state support were equalized across all public colleges, the Peltzman problem would 
be far greater.  The incentives created under such a system would cause many more students to forego 
educational resources for the sake of price.   
  The remaining price gap between public and private colleges and the continued favoritism of 
public schools under the public college voucher simulations results in nearly the same proportion of 
students choosing public colleges.  The last two simulations remove the public dimension of the aid 
completely by allowing students to apply the state voucher to any in-state public or private institution.  
As shown in columns 4 and 5 of Table 6, the voucher was recalculated as total state appropriations 
divided by the total FTE enrollment at all in-state nonspecialized colleges.  This amount was then 
subtracted from all in-state college prices, public and private.  This thereby equalizes the distribution of 
the subsidy by level and selectivity but also by sector.  The only remaining difference between public 
and private schools is control.   In comparison to the current in-kind subsidy system, this voucher plan 
would reduce the costs of less competitive colleges the most while also reducing the price difference 
between public and private institutions.    
When the state aid is distributed as a voucher that could be applied to any in-state public or 
private college, the number of students predicted to choose public four-years falls (columns 4 and 5 of 
Table 7).  If the voucher were equal regardless of the level, the number of students enrolled at public 
four-year colleges would fall 24 percent.  While many students would shift to public two-year colleges, 
the number choosing private four-year colleges is predicted to increase 20 percent in comparison to the   30
level under the current in-kind subsidy system.  If the voucher for four-year colleges was instead twice as 
large, the number at public four-year colleges is predicted to fall 14 percent but many more students 
would choose private institutions.  The number electing to attend a private four-year institution would 
increase 29 percent.  This difference lends support to Peltzman’s assertion that in-kind tuition subsidies 
at public colleges draw students away from private options.  However, the change in sector did not result 
in an increase in the mean resources received by students.  In each case, the response of low-income 
students is predicted to be far greater.  This suggests that the distortion created by the in-kind state 
subsidy is strongest for these students possibly due to their heightened sensitively to price.  In summary, 
without the in-kind format, many more students would opt out of the public higher education system.   
 
SECTION VI: CONCLUSION 
  The conditional logit model is an improvement in estimating the determinants of college choice.  
While models that use state cross-sectional variation to estimate student decisions ignore much of the 
heterogeneity in the market for higher education, my model exploits this variation to estimate the effect 
of cost and quality on the decisions of whether to go to college and which college to attend.  Conditional 
on college attendance, higher tuition costs and distance reduce the likelihood of choosing a particular 
college while student expenditures increase the probability.  These effects differ for particular groups.  
High-ability individuals are more influenced by quality measures, and low-income students are more 
responsive to distance.  When individuals consider whether to enroll, price appears to be an important 
factor.  Once determining the college the individual is most likely to consider by using the choice model, 
the elasticity of price with respect to enrollment is estimated to be much larger than previously found.  
Using this college choice model to examine students’ decisions, it is clear that the current state 
in-kind subsidy system creates a series of incentives in terms of college decisions.  First, students are 
induced to favor in-state, public institutions.  As shown by the simulations, the larger the tuition subsidy, 
the more likely students will forego a private or four-year option even if it offers far more in resources.  
Therefore, there appears to be validity to Peltzman’s hypothesis that in-kind subsidies could reduce 
educational investment.     31
Removing the in-kind format and public focus of the aid would avoid some of the concerns of 
Peltzman by reducing the price gap between public and private colleges.  As shown by the voucher 
simulations, up to 24 percent of first-year students would no longer prefer a public, four-year school if 
given the money as a voucher that could be applied to any in-state college (the decrease is smaller if the 
voucher were twice as large for four-year colleges).  As a result, the number that would choose to enroll 
in a private four-year college would increase 20 to 29 percent.  Given enrollment rates in 1992, this 
suggests that an additional 80,000 to 120,000 freshman would prefer to attend a private four-year college 
each year if the in-kind format of state subsidies was removed.  The number of students choosing to 
attend private four-year colleges would increase by 575,000 to 830,000 students.  While this is not a true 
estimate of the general equilibrium outcome of a voucher program given the absence of behavioral and 
supply responses, these results do suggest that the distortion of choice by the in-kind format is 
substantial.  If states stopped giving subsidies altogether, the difference would be even larger.  Without 
any state support, 29 percent fewer students overall and 38 percent of low-income students are predicted 
to attend public four-year colleges.  The number attending private four-year colleges would increase by 
one-third.   
In addition to creating preferences for public colleges, the pattern of state in-kind subsidies also 
favors public four-year over two-year institutions and more selective schools over those that are less 
competitive   Simulations in which the state subsidies are equally distributed among public colleges 
suggest that students would choose inexpensive two-year colleges over four-year school with far greater 
resources.  This provides further support of the influence of the in-kind aid can have on college 
decisions.  However, because the four-year institutions have more in resources, the distortion in price 
between two- and four-year public schools is probably beneficial in terms of individual college 
investments. 
   32
REFERENCES 
Allen, Robert F. and Jianshou Shen. “Some New Evidence of the Character of Competition among 
Higher Education Institutions.” Economics of Education Review, vol. 18, no. 4, 1999. 
Barron’s Educational Series. Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges. 21
st Edition. Hauppauge, New 
York: Barron’s Educational Series, 1997. 
Borsch-Supan, Axel.  “Econometric Analysis of Discrete Choice.” In M. Backmann and W. Krelle, eds. 
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1987. 
Breland, H., J. Maxey, R. Gernand, T. Cumming, and C. Trapani. Trends in College Admission 2000. 
ACT, Inc.; Association for Institutional Research; Educational Testing Service; the National 
Association for College Admission Counseling; and the College Board, 2002. 
Cameron, Stephen and James Heckman. “Can Tuition Policy Combat Rising Wage Inequality?” In 
Marvin H. Kosters, ed. Financing College Tuition: Government Policies and Educational 
Priorities. Washington: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999. 
Campbell, R. and B. Siegel. “The demand for higher education in the United States 1919–1964.” 
American Economic Review, vol. 57, 1967. 
Clotfelter, C. T. “Public Spending for Higher Education: An Empirical Test of Two Hypotheses.” Public 
Finance, vol. 31, 1976. 
College Board. Trends in College Pricing. Washington: The College Entrance Examination Board, 2002. 
Ganderton, Philip T. “The Effect of subsidies in kind on the choice of a college.”  Journal of Public 
Economics, vol. 48, 1992. 
Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence Katz. “The Shaping of Higher Education: The Formative Years in the 
United States, 1890 to 1940.”  Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 13, no. 1, 1999. 
Gottlieb, Bruce. “Do Public In-Kind Subsidies to Education reduce Social Welfare?” Harvard University 
mimeo, 1997. 
Hansen, W. Lee and Burton Weisbrod. “The Distribution of Costs and Direct Benefits of Public Higher 
Education: The Case of California.” Journal of Human Resources, vol. 4, no. 2, 1969a. 
Hansen, W. Lee and Burton Weisbrod. “On the Distribution of Costs and Direct Benefits of Public 
Higher Education: Reply.” Journal of Human Resources, vol. 4, no. 3, 1969b. 
Hopkins, T.D. “Higher Education Enrollment Demand.” Economic Inquiry, vol. 12, 1974. 
Hoxby, Caroline. “The Changing Market Structure of U.S. Higher Education.”  Harvard University 
mimeo, 1997. 
Hoxby, Caroline and Bridget Terry (Long). “Explaining Rising Income and Wage Inequality among the 
College-Educated.”  National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6873, 1999. 
Johnson, George. “Subsidies for Higher Education.”  Journal of Labor Economics, vol.2, no. 3, 1984.   33
Kane, Thomas. “Rising Public College Tuition and College Entry: How Well do Public Subsidies 
Promote Access to College?”  National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5164, 
July 1995. 
Leslie, Larry and Paul Brinkman, The Economic Value of Higher Education. New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1989. 
Long, Bridget Terry (forthcoming) “How Have College Decisions Changed Overtime? An Application 
of the Conditional Logistic Choice Model.” Journal of Econometrics. 
Luce, R.  Individual Choice Behavior.  New York: Wiley, 1959. 
McFadden, Daniel. “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior” In P. Zarembka, ed. 
Frontiers in Econometrics. New York: Academic Press, 1973. 
McFadden, Daniel. “Quantitative Methods for Analyzing Travel Behavior of Individuals: Some Recent 
Developments.”  In D. Hensher and P. Stopher, eds. Behavioural Travel Modelling.  London: 
Croom-Helm, 1979. 
McPherson, Michael and Morton O. Schapiro. “Does Student Aid affect College Enrollment? New 
Evidence on a Persistent Controversy.” American Economic Review, vol. 81, no. 1, 1991. 
Manski, C. and D. Wise. College Choice in America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983. 
National Center for Education Statistics. Digest of Education Statistics. Washington, D.C.: Department 
of Education, various years. 
Palmer, James. Grapevine. Bloomington, IL: Illinois State University, Center for the Student of 
Education Policy, 2003. 
Pechman, Joseph. “The Distributional Effects of Public Higher Education in California.”  Journal of 
Human Resources, vol. 5, no. 3, 1970. 
Pechman, Joseph. “A Note on the Intergenerational Transfer of Public Higher-Education Benefits.”  
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 80, no. 3, Part II, 1972. 
Peltzman, Sam. “The Effect of Government Subsidies-in-Kind on Private Expenditures: The Case of 
Higher Education.” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 81, no. 1,  1973. 
Poterba, James. “Government Intervention in the Markets of Education and Health Care: How and 
Why?” in Victor R. Fuchs, ed. Individual and Social Responsibility. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1996. 
Quigley, John and Daniel Rubinfeld. “Public Choices in Public Higher Education.” In Charles T. 
Clotfelter and Michael Rothschild, eds. Studies of Supply and Demand in Higher Education. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
Rouse, Cecelia.  “What to do after High School: The Two-Year versus Four-Year College Enrollment 
Decision.” In Ronald G. Ehrenberg. Choices and Consequences: Contemporary Policy Issues in 
Education. Ithaca: ILR Press, 1994. 
Sonstelie, Jon. “The Welfare Cost of Free Public Schools.” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 90, no. 4, 
1982.   34
FIGURE 1: CALIFORNIA – Four-year Colleges and Universities  
                 
 Tuition  PUBLIC Institutions  PRIVATE Institutions           Tuition 
Most Competitive (SAT 625-800 or ACT 30-26) 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $21,571 
     
  California Institute of Technology 
  $3,248  University of California - Berkeley  Stanford University  $15,767 
    Harvey Mudd College 
  state aid = $10,364/student Pomona  College 
  Claremont McKenna College 
     
Highly Competitive (SAT 575-625 or ACT 28-29) 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $17,438 
     
  $2,903  University of California – Los Angeles      None           ---- 
 
  state aid = $10,820/student 
     
Very Competitive (SAT 525-575 or ACT 25-27) 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $9,806 
     
  University of California – San Diego  Thomas Aquinas College 
  $2,448  University of California – Davis  Occidental College  $13,233 
    University of California – Irvine  Scripps College   
     and three others     and ten others 
 
  state aid = $7,829/student 
     
Competitive (SAT 450-525 or ACT 22-24) 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $6,190 
     
  Univ. of California – SantaBarbara  Saint Mary’s College of CA 
  University of California – Riverside  Christian Heritage College 
  California State Univ. – Bakersfield  Chapman University 
  $1,700  California State Univ. – Fresno  University of the Pacific  $10,134 
    California State Univ. – Long Beach  Whittier College   
  California State Univ. – Chico  Fresno Pacific College 
   and eight others     and fifteen others 
 
  state aid = $5,704 /student    
     
Less Competitive (SAT below 450 or ACT below 21) 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $6,160 
     
  San Jose State University  Samuel Merritt College 
  California State Univ. - Stanislaus  Cogswell College 
  $1,459  California State Univ. – San Marcos  West Coast University  $9,631   
    and four others     and two others 
 
  state aid = $6,496 /student      
     
Noncompetitive 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $3,908 
     
   Simpson  College 
    ----    None  Antioch University – Los Angeles  $6,110 
         and fifteen others   
 
 
Sources: Barron’s Educational Guides and 1991-92 IPEDS.  Notes: Amounts are in 1992 dollars.  State aid is 
appropriations divided by FTE students.  Aid, tuition, and expenditures are reported as means for the group.    35
FIGURE 2: MASSACHUSETTS – Four-year Colleges and Universities   
                  
 Tuition  PUBLIC Institutions  PRIVATE Institutions                 Tuition 
Most Competitive (SAT 625-800 or ACT 30-26) 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $16,685 
     
 Harvard  University 
 ----    None Amherst  College  $17,271 
        Massachusetts Institute of Tech.    
         and three others  
     
Highly Competitive (SAT 575-625 or ACT 28-29) 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $11,432 
     
     Boston  College   
    ----    None  Worcester Polytechnic Institute  $16,472 
     Tufts  University   
         and three others  
     
Very Competitive (SAT 525-575 or ACT 25-27) 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $7,745 
     
   Brandeis  University 
     ----    None Wheaton  College  $14,621 
       Babson  College     
       and seven others    
     
Competitive (SAT 450-525 or ACT 22-24) 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $5,380 
     
  University of Mass. - Amherst  Gordon College 
  Framingham State College  Northeastern University 
  $3,520  Worcester State College  Eastern Nazarene College  $10,395 
    University of Mass. - Dartmouth  Simmons College   
    University of Mass. - Lowell  Endicott College 
     and four others     and eight others 
 
  state aid = $3,039 /student        
     
Less Competitive (SAT below 450 or ACT below 21) 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $5,420 
     
  Fitchburg State College  Springfield College 
  $3,021  Massachusetts Maritime Academy  Western New England College  $10,180 
    Salem State College  Hebrew College       
 
   state aid = $5,943 /student   and seven others 
     
Noncompetitive 
Student Expenditures per Pupil = $5,627 
  
   Lasell  College 
    ----    None  Saint Hyacinth College  $8,912 





Sources: Barron’s Educational Guides and 1991-92 IPEDS.  Notes: Amounts are in 1992 dollars.  State aid is 
appropriations divided by FTE students.  Aid, tuition, and expenditures are reported as means for the group.  
















(extended budget constraint)  
Educational
Units 
Other Goods   37
FIGURE 4: ILLINOIS – Four-year Colleges and Universities 
              
  Public Institutions    Private Institutions   
  Most Competitive   
  Student Expenditures per Pupil = $24,511   
---  None    Two  $16,226 
  Highly Competitive   
  Student Expenditures per Pupil = $7,707   
$3,458  One  
state aid = $7,373 /student 
  Three  $11,857 
  Very Competitive   
  Student Expenditures per Pupil = $6,625   
---  None    Seven  $11,489 
  Competitive   
  Student Expenditures per Pupil = $5,221   
$2,672  Seven  
state aid = $4,172 /student 
  Twenty-eight  $9,108 
  Less Competitive   
  Student Expenditures per Pupil = $4,091   
$2,013  Two 
 state aid = $3,575 /student 
  Three  $9,536 
  Noncompetitive   
  Student Expenditures per Pupil = $5,341   
$2,035  Two  
state aid = $3,426 /student 
  Nine  $6,285 
 
See the notes to the next figure.    
 
 
FIGURE 5: NEBRASKA – Four-year Colleges and Universities 
      
  Public Institutions    Private Institutions   
  Most Competitive   
---  None  None  --- 
  Highly Competitive   
---  None    None  --- 
  Very Competitive   
  Student Expenditures per Pupil = $18,182   
---  None    One  $9,670 
  Competitive   
  Student Expenditures per Pupil = $4,659   
$1,954  Two 
state aid = $4,172 /student 
  Seven  $7,439 
  Less Competitive   
  Student Expenditures per Pupil = $4,226   
$1,467  One 
 state aid = $2,504 /student 
  Two  $8,450 
  Noncompetitive   
  Student Expenditures per Pupil = $2,949   
$1,615  Three  
state aid = $2,631 /student 
  Three  $3,063 
           
Sources: Barron’s Educational Guides and 1991-92 IPEDS.  Notes: Amounts are in 1992 dollars.  State aid is 
appropriations divided by FTE students.  Aid, tuition, and expenditures are reported as means for the group.    38
TABLE 1: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Description  Mean 
(standard deviation) 
A. Student Characteristics (NELS88) 
Student SAT  Student SAT, converted ACT score, or predicted SAT based 
on high school GPA 
878 
(212) 
Student SAT percentile  SAT score transformed into a percentile  49 
(29) 
High-Ability   Dummy Variable for Students with SAT greater than or 
equal to 1100 
0.152 
Low-Income   Dummy Variable for Students with a family income less 
than $20,000 in 1991 
0.201 
B. College Characteristics (1991-92 IPEDS unless otherwise noted) 
Student Expenditures  Expenditures on instruction, academic support, and student 
services per pupil (school resources) 
$4,452 
(3,516) 
School SAT  Median student body SAT score (peer resources) (Barron’s 
Profiles of American Colleges) 
835 
(153) 
School SAT percentile  Median student body SAT transformed into a percentile  43 
(23) 
FTE Enrollment  Full-time Equivalent Undergraduate Enrollment in 1991-92  3,304 
(4,389) 
Student-Faculty Ratio  FTE Undergraduate Enrollment divided by FTE Faculty 
(Source: American Survey of Colleges, 1991-92) 
15.2 
(4.6) 
Percent of Faculty    
with a Ph.D. 
Percent of faculty with a Ph.D. or other terminal (Source: 





Groupings based on student test scores, high school rank, 
and college acceptance rate (Source: Barron’s Guide) 
--- 
Two-year   Dummy Variable for Two-year colleges  0.430 
Public  Dummy Variable for Public colleges  0.538 
C. Match-Specific Variables (Interacting Student Characteristics with College Characteristics) 




Distance  The number of miles between the student’s high school and 
the college based off zip codes 
1,031 
(725) 
SAT Difference: Student 
%tile higher 
Equal to the difference in SAT percentiles if the student’s 
SAT is greater than the school’s 
18.4 
(22.9) 
SAT Difference: School 
%tile higher 
Equal to the difference in SAT percentiles if the school’s 
median SAT is greater than the student’s 
12.3 
(19.7) 
   39
TABLE 2: Conditional Logistic Estimation of the Decisions between Colleges  
Marginal Effect on the Probability of Enrollment (z-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent Variable: Attended College j within Two Years of Graduation  




College Costs           
Tuition Price net Pell 
(per $1,000)    -.3930 








2)    .0186 







(per 100 miles)    -.8099 








2 miles)    .1206 






College Quality and Size           
Student Expenditures 
(per $1,000)    .0425 
(2.67)    .0825 
(3.77)    .1451 
(4.45) 
Student Exp. Squared 
(per $1,000
2)    -.0005 
(1.03)    -.0047 





(2.49)    .0117 
(2.73)    
Percent of Faculty with 
Ph.D. (per 10 pts) 
.0056 
(5.75)    .0053 
(5.46)    
FTE Enrollment 
(per 1,000)    .1549 
(33.20)    .1548 
(32.99)    
Student-College Match           
Student %tile larger  
(per 10 pts)    -.2883 
(11.45)    -.2822 
(10.81)    
Student larger Squared  
(per 10
2 pts)    -.0124 
(2.83)    -.0048 
(1.00)    
School %tile larger  
(per 10 pts)    .1916 
(5.03)    .2872 
(7.04)    
School larger Squared  
(per 10
2 pts)    -.2883 
(9.28)    -.0569 
(9.99)    
Two-year Colleges           
Two-Year College 
     Dummy Variable    .3800 
(4.99)    .3152 
(4.16)    
Strata (individuals)    5,683    5,683     
N (combinations)    15,167,927    15,167,927    
Pseudo R-squared    .3999    .4080    
Sources: NELS88 individual data and 1991-92 IPEDS college data.  
Notes: Sample includes only those who attended college.  Marginal effects are interpreted as the percentage by 
which the probability favoring attendance at college j is affected with a one-unit increase in that variable. Monetary 
amounts are in 1992 dollars. Tuition is defined as list tuition price net the student’s expected federal Pell Grant 
(based on income).  Student expenditures are defined as instruction, academic support and student services.  FTE 
Enrollment is for undergraduates in 1991.  Low income is defined as a family income below $20,000 in 1991. High-
SAT is defined as scoring 1100 or above.  The model also includes: cubic distance and FTE enrollment squared.     40
TABLE 3: Logistic Estimation of the College Enrollment Decision  
Marginal Effect on the Probability of Enrollment (z-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent Variable: Attended Any College within Two Years of Graduation  
(3) 




















  -.0010 









  -.0035 
(0.62)    .0085** 
(3.74)   
Distance 
(per 100 miles) 
-.4463** 
(3.88) 
  -.1186 









  .0039 
(0.16)    .0060 
(1.34)   
Student SAT percentile 




      
Student %tile larger  
(per 10 pts)   
  -.1216** 
(4.55)    -.0908** 
(2.05)   
School %tile larger  
(per 10 pts)   
  -.0888** 
(6.15)    -.0425** 





  -.0117 









  .0003 
(1.46)    -.0003 
(1.12)   
Public, Two-year 
Dummy   
 
   -.3179** 





  .0150 
(1.42)    .0174 
(1.63)   
Pseudo R-squared  5,661    5,661   5,661 --- 
Observations .0479    .0500   .0522 --- 
** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
Sources: NELS88 individual data and 1991-92 IPEDS college data. 
Notes: Marginal effects are interpreted as the percentage by which the probability favoring attendance at any college 
is affected with a one-unit increase in that variable.   Figures are in 1992 dollars.  FTE Enrollment is for 
undergraduates in 1991.  All regressions include the following controls: gender, race (Black, Hispanic, Asian, 
Native American), 1991 family income, parents’ education, private high school dummy, and a dummy for 
completing the GED.  The predicted college choice (specification 3) is determined by the conditional logistic model 
in Table 2, specification 2.  The predicted college choice is the closest public, two-year college for 14.1% and the 
closest public, four-year college for 35.6% of the sample.  Of the remaining colleges, 74.9 percent are public, four-
year colleges, 14.0 percent are public, two-year colleges, and 11.1 percent are private, four-year colleges.   41
TABLE 4: Comparing Actual to Predicted College Investments (means reported) 
    Actual College Choices    Predicted Choices 










A. The Whole Sample 
Attended or  
Predicted to Attend 
 
  3,841 1,842    3,829 1,857 
Number to Publics    2,547 (66%)  1,764 (96%)    2,706 (71%)  1,749 (94%) 
List Tuition    $5,863 $1,621  $5,634 $2,030 
Distance (miles)    231 89    188 181 
Student Expenditures    $7,466 $3,388  $7,422 $3,487 
SAT Percentile    67.60 ---    67.61 --- 
B. High-Ability Students (SAT ≥ 1100) 
Attended or  
Predicted to Attend 
 
  966 109    980 107 
Number to Publics    506 (52%)  107 (98%)    539 (55%)  100 (93%) 
List Tuition    $8,600 $1,563  $8,484 $2,261 
Distance (miles)    337 117    311 344 
Student Expenditures    $10,492 $3,407  $10,643 $3,749 
SAT Percentile    79.79 ---    78.17 --- 
C. Low-Income Students (family income below $20,000 in 1991) 
Attended or  
Predicted to Attend 
 
  507 370    542 373 
Number to Publics    377 (74%)  356 (96%)    434 (80%)  352 (94%) 
List Tuition    $4,335 $1,476  $4,004 $1,970 
Distance (miles)    181 86    139 159 
Student Expenditures    $6,396 $3,445  $6,315 $3,440 
SAT Percentile    59.84 ---    62.20 --- 
Sources: NELS88 individual data and 1991-92 IPEDS college data. 
Notes: Colleges were weighted by: (1) the relative odds of that person choosing that college (calculated from Table 
2, specification 2), and (2) the individual likelihood of attendance (calculated from Table 3, specification 3).  
Figures are in 1992 dollars. List tuition is the in-state price if the student attended high school in that state; 
otherwise it is the out-of-state price.  Student expenditures are funds for instruction, academic support and student 
services.    42
TABLE 5: State Simulations – Predicted Choices as a Resident of each State (means reported) 
 CALIFORNIA  ILLINOIS  NEBRASKA  MASSACHUSETTS
State Subsidy Level  High  Medium  Medium  Low 
Public College Quality   Much variation  Some variation  Little variation  Little variation 
A. The Whole Sample 
Total Predicted to Attend  5,785 5,692  5,768  5,731 
Four-year Colleges        
Predicted to Attend   3,377 3,718  4,367  3,903 
Number to Publics  3,110 (92%)  2,529 (68%)  3,329 (76%)  2,293 (59%) 
List Tuition  $2,826 $5,781  $4,065  $8,252 
Student Expenditures  $9,244 $7,369  $5,759  $8,085 
SAT Percentile  68.74 65.41  60.22  67.73 
Two-year Colleges        
Predicted to Attend   2,408 1,974  1,401  1,828 
Number to Publics  2,367 (98%)  1,852 (94%)  1,339 (96%)  1,629 (89%) 
List Tuition  $405 $3,038  $2,194  $3,199 
B. High-Ability Students (SAT ≥ 1100) 
Total Predicted to Attend  1,088 1,079  1,072  1,111 
Four-year Colleges        
Predicted to Attend   978 967  948  1,025 
Number to Publics  880 (90%)  558 (58%)  605 (64%)  330 (32%) 
List Tuition  $3,755 $7,946  $6,302  $11,991 
Student Expenditures  $12,759 $10,448 $8,149  $12,979 
SAT Percentile  80.22 75.04  68.29  80.86 
Two-year Colleges        
Predicted to Attend   110 112  124  86 
Number to Publics  105 (96%)  104 (93%)  116 (93%)  75 (88%) 
List Tuition  $670 $3,132  $2,627  $3,400 
C. Low-Income Students (Family income below $20,000 in 1991) 
Total Predicted to Attend  945 918  938  934 
Four-year Colleges        
Predicted to Attend   525 503  676  544 
Number to Publics  481 (92%)  367 (73%)  525 (78%)  380 (70%) 
List Tuition  $2,721 $4,938  $3,356  $6,875 
Student Expenditures  $8,688 $6,838  $5,240  $6,870 
SAT Percentile  67.38 62.57  57.72  62.92 
Two-year Colleges        
Predicted to Attend   420 415  262  390 
Number to Publics  408 (97%)  391 (94%)  252 (96%)  350 (90%) 
List Tuition  $545 $3,080  $2,130  $3,173 
Sources: NELS88 individual data and 1991-92 IPEDS college data. 
Notes: Colleges were weighted by: (1) the relative odds of that person choosing that college (calculated from Table 
2, specification 2), and (2) the individual likelihood of attendance (calculated from Table 3, specification 3).  
Figures are in 1992 dollars. List tuition is the in-state price if the student attended high school in that state; 
otherwise it is the out-of-state price.  Student expenditures are funds for instruction, academic support and student 
services.  
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TABLE 6: Mean Voucher and Tuition Price under Different Aid Schemes 
  In-kind 
Subsidy    Voucher to  
In-State Public Colleges 
 
 






Voucher Details  Current system    2yr = 4yr  2yr = ½ 4yr    2yr = 4yr  2yr = ½ 4yr    None 
 (1)    (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)    (6) 
A. Mean State Voucher       











  None 











  None 
B. Mean Tuition Price – Public Colleges       
Public Four-years              
Most, Highly, and 
Very Competitive 
2,821 
(1,100)    5,656 
(3,280) 
4,694 
(3,225)    6,432 
(3,280) 
5,823 
(3,262)    9,038 
(3,281) 
Competitive  2,291 
(814)    3,341 
(2,278) 
2,491 
(2,252)    4,073 
(2,389) 
3,517 
(2,444)    6,672 
(2,271) 
Less Competitive  1,982 
(790)    2,346 
(1,621) 
1,546 
(1,616)    2,988 
(1,747) 
2,415 
(1,830)    5,774 
(1,566) 
Noncompetitive  2,720 
(1,326)    2,280 
(1,601) 
1,718 
(1,510)    3,081 
(1,777) 
2,728 
(1,797)    5,447 
(1,605) 
Public Two-years              
Noncompetitive  1,260 
(961)    419 
(1,045) 
1,067 
(1,339)    759 
(1,286) 
1,478 
(1,484)    3,041 
(1,494) 
C. Mean Tuition Price – Private Colleges       
Private Four-years                












Competitive  9,204 
(2,320) 








Less Competitive  7,562 
(2,356) 
 




for all  
private 
colleges 




for all  
private 












for all  
private 
colleges 
Noncompetitive  5,714 
(2,391) 







   
Private Two-years               
Noncompetitive  6,164 
(2,161) 







   
Source: 1991-92 IPEDS college data and college groupings from the Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges. 
Notes: Figures are in 1992 dollars.  Where applicable, the tuition price is adjusted for the loss of state appropriations 
per FTE student minus any voucher.  The voucher value was calculated as the total state appropriations for 
nonspecialized colleges divided by the FTE number of students attending these colleges (for simulations 2 and 3, 
only students attending public colleges were counted).  In the simulations in which the four-year voucher is twice as 
large as the two-year voucher (simulations 3 and 5), 70 percent of students are assumed to attend four-year schools.  
Given the distribution of different types and levels of colleges across states with different levels of support, the 
mean values do not reflect the simple subtraction of the voucher amount from the unsubsidized cost.   44
TABLE 7: Predicted College Investments under Different Aid Schemes 
 In-kind  Subsidy    Voucher to any 
In-State Public College 
 
 
Voucher to any 
In-State College 
 
  No State Support 
Voucher Details  Current system    2yr = 4yr  2yr = ½ 4yr    2yr = 4yr  2yr = ½ 4yr    None 
 (1)    (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)    (6) 
A. The Whole Sample         
Total Enrollment  5,686    5,643  5,702    5,611  5,664    5,535 
Four-year Colleges                  
Predicted to Enroll  3,829    3,370  3,749    3,396  3,766    3,414 
No. to Publics  2,706 (71%)    2,371 (70%)  2,778 (74%)    2,050 (60%)  2,321 (62%)    1,925 (56%) 
Tuition Price  $5,634    $5,723  $4,953    $5,840  $5,272    $7,956 
Expenditures $7,422    $6,814  $6,642    $6,802  $6,643    $7,245 
SAT percentile  67.61    64.95  64.52    64.61  64.07    66.22 
Two-year Colleges                  
Predicted to Enroll  1,857    2,273  1,953    2,215  1,898    2,121 
No. to Publics  1,749 (94%)    2,161 (95%)  1,840 (94%)    2,033 (92%)  1,744 (92%)    1,943 (92%) 
Tuition Price  $2,030    $1,666  $2,095    $1,833  $2,332    $3,328 
B. High-Ability Students (SAT ≥ 1100)       
Total Enrollment  1,087    1,085  1,083    1,084  1,084    1,096 
Four-year Colleges                  
Predicted to Enroll  980    921  948    924  951    954 
No. to Publics  539 (55%)    503 (55%)  551 (58%)    455 (49%)  480 (50%)    431 (45%) 
Tuition Price  $8,484    $8,663  $7,938    $8,621  $8,125    $10,407 
Expenditures $10,643    $9,915  $9,629    $9,973  $9,787    $10,688 
SAT percentile  78.17    75.44  74.87    75.44  75    77.17 
Two-year Colleges                  
Predicted to Enroll  107    164  135    160  133    142 
No. to Publics  100 (93%)    154 (94%)  126 (93%)    146 (91%)  42 (31%)    129 (91%) 
Tuition Price  $2,261    $1,832  $228    $1,994  $2,494    $3,343 
See the notes on the following page.   45
TABLE 7: Predicted College Investments under Different Aid Schemes – continued  
C. Low-Income Students (Family income below $20,000 in 1991)         
Total  Enrollment  915   904  912    898  906   864 
Four-year Colleges                 
Predicted to Enroll  542    500  529    497  536    446 
No. to Publics  434 (80%)    384 (77%)  417 (79%)    324 (65%)  354 (66%)    268 (60%) 
Tuition  Price  $4,004   $4,799  $4,455    $4,804  $4,471   $7,000 
Expenditures  $6,315   $5,764  $5,808    $5,699  $5,701   $6,069 
SAT  percentile  62.2   59.71  59.87    59.11  59.19   60.3 
Two-year Colleges                 
Predicted to Enroll  373    404  383    401  370    418 
No. to Publics  352 (94%)    379 (94%)  359 (94%)    363 (91%)  338 (91%)    381 (91%) 
Tuition  Price  $1,970   $2,902  $2,956    $2,884  $3,019   $3,806 
Sources: NELS88 individual data and 1991-92 IPEDS college data. 
Notes: Colleges were weighted by: (1) the relative odds of that person choosing that college (calculated from Table 2, specification 2), and (2) the individual 
likelihood of attendance (calculated from Table 3, specification 3).  Figures are in 1992 dollars.  Where applicable, the tuition price is adjusted for the loss of 
state appropriations per FTE student minus any voucher.  The voucher value was calculated as the total state appropriations for nonspecialized colleges divided 
by the FTE number of students attending these colleges (for simulations 2 and 3, only students attending public colleges were counted).  In the simulations in 
which the four-year voucher is twice as large as the two-year voucher (simulations 3 and 5), 70 percent of students are assumed to attend four-year schools.   